This paper investigates the relations between aggregate trading volume and information on nancial markets from a theoretical standpoint. Through numerical examples, it relates some statistics describing equilibrium price and volume{such as the variance of the price and its correlation with the true asset value, the volume mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis{to the distribution of information across traders. The analysis is carried out in a static noisy rational expectations framework, with multiple informed traders, where both the precision and the correlation of the signals observed by the traders can be modied.
Introduction
Trading volume has received a lot of attention from practitioners and academics alike. Technical analysts use trading volume as an indicator that \new and compelling information is owing into the market" (Saitta (1996) ). Regulators have recently contemplated using trading volume as a tool to detect market manipulations. This seems to warrant further theoretical eorts to investigate the relations between volume and information. The paper's objective is to relate the patterns of aggregate volume to the underlying distribution of information across traders from a theoretical perspective. It sets out to relate some important descriptive statistics of volume, such as its mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis{together with some price statistics{to the distribution of information among traders, i.e., the precision of their information and the degree of agreement in their valuations of the asset. The analysis is carried out in a noisy rational expectations framework with a competitive securities market and multiple informed traders. When closed-form solutions for the equilibrium price are not available, a simple numerical method is introduced to compute noisy rational expectations equilibria with a exible parameter structure.
The present approach follows the seminal work of Diamond and Verrechia (1981) and the more recent papers by, among others, Grundy and McNichols (1989) , and Brown and Jennings (1989) . The present model features a competitive securities market with multiple informed traders and a liquidity trader. One contribution of the paper is that the signals observed by the informed traders can be both correlated and have dierent precisions. This makes it easier to study the the heterogeneity of beliefs, a key element in understanding the behavior of trading volume. In Diamond and Verrechia (1981) , Brown and Jennings (1989) , and He and Wang (1995) , the signals observed by the informed traders are independently and identically distributed, when conditioned on the true value of the asset. 1 In Grundy and McNichols (1989) , the signals are correlated across traders but have the same precision. In a dierent framework, Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) use signals with varying precisions. As pointed by Jain (1988) , the response of trading volume to economic news may indicate the degree to which market participants disagree about the eect of the announcement. With identically distributed signals, the heterogeneity of beliefs is ex-post, i.e., the realizations of the privately observed signals may be dierent across agents even though the signals are all independently drawn from the same distribution. In an ex-ante approach, the focus is shifted from the dierence in the realization of the signals to the dierence in their distribution. The heterogeneity of beliefs depends on the degree of disagreement among traders about the true asset value and on the dierence in the precision of the information they possessed. normally distributed. Each trader has a CARA utility function u i ( i ) with risk aversion coecient i . 2 Agent i's prot, i , is the random variable y i (x p), where y i is the demand of trader i, x the true value of the asset, and p the market price. The (n + 1 ) th trader is a noise trader, whose demand is y n+1 = b(p "), where b > 0, and " is uncorrelated with the true value of the asset. In the simulations, unless specied otherwise, var(x)equals var("), which would bethe variance of the market-clearing price with no informed traders.
Informed traders submit demand schedules as functions of the market-clearing price. Each informed trader chooses y i to maximize E[u( i )jG i ; p ]. The framework described above must be seen as a`reduced form' of a structural model, which w ould introduce another period where agents consume but do not trade, and a riskless asset that traders could purchase or sell to nance to desired holdings of risky securities, as in Diamond and Verrechia (1981) .
Let [xjG i ;p] . The agent takes into account that p is the market-clearing price, i.e., p = n 1 i v i + n +1 ", with = n 1 i , i = i b + , for i = 1 ; : : : ; n , and n+1 = b b+ (in the applications, b = 1). Note that n+1 i=1 i = 1 , i is the weight of the i th trader in the determination of the market-clearing price. As a result, trader i's equilibrium valuation is v i such that
Equation (1) is an example of`innite regress'. For any two agents i and j, agent i's valuation depends on agent j's valuation, in turn, agent j's valuation depends on agent i's valuation, and so forth. Besides, in (1), traders have to take into account the`noise' injected in the trading by ". Equilibrium valuations can bethought of as solutions to n simultaneous equations similar to (1), with i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Solutions to this system of equations may fail to exist. The limit to innite regress is common knowledge, which, in the absence of noise, can result in an equilibrium where no trade takes place, as in Milgrom and Stockey (1982) . As proposition (1) 
Proof of proposition 1: Suppose there is a normally distributed xed point z = ( v ; G ; " ; x 
Suppose that n i=1 i d i = 1, then " and the G i would be correlated, which contradicts the assumption that the liquidity shock is uncorrelated with the signals. Hence, n i=1 i d i 6 = 1, and p can be written as a linear combination of the state variables. When the precision of the signal is equal across traders, the coecient a 1 , a 2 , a 3 have a closed form solution. Otherwise, one has to use numerical techniques.
Often in the literature (for example, Diamond and Verrechia (1981), Wang (1994) ) each trader's private signal is assumed to bethe sum of the true asset value and a`measurement error' term, assumed to identically and independently distributed across traders (in that sense, the signals are conditionally identically and independently distributed, when conditioned on the true asset value). In the present formulation, this boils down to having 1 = 2 = 2 . 3 The`measurement error' approach doe not allow c hanging the precision without aecting the correlation of the signals. 
The equilibrium price is also equal to an weighted average of the trader's valuation of the asset and the liquidity noise. 
The fth line comes from the fact that G 2 G 1 and " are uncorrelated with G 1 and that all the variables are normally distributed. We conclude that
Combining equations (5) and (7), we get Those are the same coecients as the ones obtained with two rational traders and perfectly correlated signals ( = 1). This shows that assuming that the traders are naive can lead to some serious misspecications.
Figure (1) displays the coecients a and b as a function of for = 0 (the solid line) and = 1 (the dotted line) obtained with rational traders, with = 1 representing also the naive traders' case. Note that when = 0, the maximum level of is 1 p 2 , while when = 1 , can take v alues up to 1. In all cases, a = 0 when = 0 and rises with . The coecient o n " is a decreasing function of in the naive case, but can bean increasing function of in the rational case, and is always greater in the rational case than in the naive case. Figure ( 2) displays rational equilibrium a and b as a function of , setting equal to :5, 0, :5, and 1.
Equilibrium with two informed traders when the informed traders' signals have dierent precision.
This section develops an algorithm to compute a solution to the xed point problem for the informed traders' valuations (equation (1)). We c hecked that, when the information precision is equal across traders, the solutions obtained numerically are identical to the closed-form solutions. Equation (1) can be rewritten as an evolution equation for agent i's valuation (equation (11).
where
, (p) i being the conditional variance of x conditioned on agent i information in the p th run of the algorithm. (p) , which evolve according to (p+1) = F ( (p) ). F is a non-linear function due to the updating of the 0 i s. I could not show the existence of a xed point; instead, a xed point w as obtained for F using numerical techniques. However, the unicity of the equilibrium is not established. In the cases studied, the xed point matrix is nonsingular , i.e., v has a non degenerate normal distribution. One can then calculate the variance-covariance matrix of the trading volume and the true value of the asset, and compute some statistics describing the trading volume. One can verify that, without informed traders, no agent trades, which is in line with the no-trade theorems. When the informed traders' signals have the same precision, the numerical solution yields the same equilibrium covariance matrix for the state vector (and the same coecient a and b in (4)) as the closed-form solution.
To compute (11), note that, if p (k) is the market-clearing price for the k th run of the algorithm,
A , 0 i s a ( n + 2 ) n v ector of zeroes and I n+2 is the (n + 2 ) ( n + 2) identity matrix. We get
Furthermore, at each iteration, p (k) is also linear in the state variables. The conditional variances can be recursively computed as follows.
where x and v i are selection matrices such that x = x z, and v i = v i z. Let z 0 = ( G 1 ; G 2 ; " ; x ) 0 and M 0 = cov(z 0 ). The elements of z 0 are the fundamental parameters dening the problem. We start the recursions with v (0
In the following equations, demands for the asset {as functions of the informed agents' valuations and the liquidity shock{ are derived in the case of two informed traders. Formulas can be generalized 7 to situations with more traders. The trading volume is dened to be the sum of the positive parts of the traders' demands, i.e., z = n+1 i=1 y + i , where y i is the demand (negative or positive) of agent i for the asset, and y + i = I[y i > 0] y i , with I being the indicator function. As z is the sum of the truncated demand y i 's, the statistics characterizing z depend not only on the characteristics of every individual y i , but also on the crosscorrelations, which depends in turn in very non-linear ways on the cross-correlations of the informed traders' signals, that is, on how m uch they agree. The traders' demands are cross-correlated even if the original signals are not for two reasons. First each individual equilibrium valuation depend on all the other valuations, this might induce correlation across them. Second, the demands depend on price, which i s a w eighted average of traders' valuations. Besides, as proposition (2) shows, the demand of a well-informed trader will have the same coecient o f v ariation, skewness, and kurtosis as the demand of a non-informed one. This is because these measures are normalized. 7 Proposition 2 The coecient of variation, skewness and kurtosis of the each informed trader's demand are independent of the precision of the informed t r ader's signal and the correlation between 6 A dierent approach is taken by Harris and Raviv (1993) , and Kandel and Pearson (1995) . 8 these signals, and are equal to the coecient of variation, skewness and kurtosis of a standard normal random variable truncated at zero.
The proof is in the appendix.
The dependence of the trading volume's normalized statistics on the correlations between the demand is made clear in the case of one liquidity trader and two informed traders, as shown in proposition (3).
Proposition 3 With two informed traders and one liquidity trader the coecient of variation, the skewness and the kurtosis of the aggregate volume depend only on the correlation between the demands of the two informed traders, and the ratio of the variances of the demands The proof is in the appendix.
An important consequence of proposition (3) is that, if the informed traders have identically precise information (i.e., 1 = 2 ), the coecient of variation, the skewness and the kurtosis of the aggregate trading volume depend only on the how they agree, i.e., on the correlation between the two initial signals. Proposition (3) also shows that the coecient of variation, the skewness or the kurtosis cannot be used to detect dierences between the overall information quality o f t w o markets when the quality of the private information is equal across traders within each market. Those statistics will be the same in a market with identically poorly informed traders and in one with identically well informed traders.
With the coecient of variation, skewness and the kurtosis, in a model with two informed traders and one liquidity trader, are plotted on Figure ( 3) as functions of the ratio of the variance of the informed traders and the correlation between their demands. Without loss of generality, the demand variance ratio can beconstrained to bebetween zero and one 8 When one trader has no information, the demand variance ratio is zero, when both traders are equally well informed, the ratio is one. When the ratio decreases, the coecient o f v ariation tends to go up, but the skewness and the kurtosis go up or down, depending on the correlation between the demand. Besides, for any given value of the variance ratio, the eect of increasing the correlation between the traders' demands is not monotonic. Ultimately, the non-monotonicities in the relation between demands' characteristics (variance ratio and correlation) and volume characteristics are compounded by the complexity of the relations between the characteristics of the traders' information and those of their demands. Still, the graphs reveal some characteristics of volume which are independent of the demand covariance structure. Aggregate volume exhibits positive s k ewness and excess kurtosis (i.e., kurtosis superior to 3, the value for a normally distributed variable). Its mean is superior to its median and the tail of its distribution is fatter than for a normal distribution. In sum, its distribution is dominated by rare occurrence of large surges in volume.
Numerical examples
The fundamental parameters are: the correlations between the signals and true asset value ( 1 and 2 ), the correlation between these signals (), and the variance of the liquidity shock ( 2 " ). The nal objects of interest are the following characteristics of the equilibrium price and aggregate volume: the variance of the price, its correlation with the asset value (its`informativeness'), the mean and variance of the aggregate volume, its coecient o f v ariation, skewness and kurtosis. By construction, the mean price is zero. The relation between the fundamentals and the nal object of analysis are complex, and few conclusions can be derived analytically. Therefore, I resort to simulations, varying some parameters and trying to make sense of the eect on the price and the volume. 9 The informed traders' signals interact with the liquidity shock at two stages: the formation of the equilibrium valuations, and the formation of the equilibrium volume. This complex mixing of the traders' information may explain the non-linearities in the relations between the fundamentals on one side, and the price and the aggregate volume on the other. One result that can bederived analytically is that, with a liquidity trader and a single informed trader, the equilibrium price variance, its informativeness, the mean and variance of the equilibrium volume are increasing in the precision of the informed trader's signal. As shown below, these results are still valid with multiple informed traders. I construct four experiments. As the eect of varying one parameter might depend on the value of all the others, for each experiment, I vary two parameters, and produce a three-dimensional graph and a contour graph, where a darker shade indicates lower values for the variable. In the rst experiment, the precision of the signal is identical across traders ( 1 = 2 = ), I vary the common level of the precision and the correlation of the signals (). In the second experiment, the precision of the second signal is maintained constant at 0:5, while I vary the precision of the rst signal and the correlation between the two signals. In the third experiment, the correlation among signals is set equal to zero, and I vary the precision of each signal independently. In the fourth experiment, the precision of the signal is identical across traders, I vary the common level of the precision and the variance of the liquidity shock. In the following, I describe the main features of the graphs and try to give some intuitive explanations for them. Furthermore, results are summarized in table (2) For each experiment, I estimate the semi-elasticities of some observable market statistics{the price variance, the volume mean and variance{with respect to the parameters In the rst experiment, I vary the correlation between the signals and the common value of their precision. The graphs are displayed in Figures (4) to (7) . Whatever the correlation between the signals is, increasing their common precision tends to raise the price variance, its informativeness, together with the volume mean and variance, while lowering the coecient of variation. The eect on the skewness and kurtosis is less clear, as it depends on the correlation between the signals. To shed some light o n the patterns for price, recall that the market-clearing price is a weighted sum of the valuations and the noise: p = 1 v 1 + 2 v 2 + ( 1 1 2 ) " , with i = i 1 + 2 +b , and i = 1 var(xjG i ;p) , for i = 1 ; 2. The more precise the original signals are, the higher are the variance of the valuations, their correlation, and their weight i . Hence, more precise signals generate a more volatile and informative market price. As for the patterns for volume, with more precise information, each trader's demand becomes more volatile, resulting in a higher and more volatile aggregate volume.
The precision of the price tends to go down as the correlation between signals increases when :5 (for lower values of , the price informativeness as a function of tends to have a U-shape that is more dicult to explain). That the price might be less informative when the signals are more correlated is quite intuitive since the market price is a noisy aggregate of the traders' information; a more diverse pool of private signals (a low correlation between signals) will generate a more informative equilibrium price. This intuition is even clearer for a totally revealing price, i.e., for p = E[xjG 1 ; G 2 ]; as the correlation coecient b e t w een G 1 and G 2 gets smaller, the pair (G 1 ; G 2 ) spans more of the space of the possible realizations of x and makes the resulting equilibrium price p more informative. Of course, in our case, the market-clearing price is a noisy aggregate of the signals, but the intuition should hold. The variance of the volume is increasing with the correlation of the signals, while the mean volume is decreasing in this parameter. The eect of increasing the correlation of the signals on the coecient o f v ariation, the skewness and the kurtosis of the volume depends on the level of the information precision. The last three statistics attain their minimum when the informed traders' signals are very precise and not correlated. This shows that informed trading does not always translate into fat tails in the distribution of volume.
In the second experiment, the precision of the second signal is maintained constant at 0:5, while I vary the precision of the rst signal and the correlation between signals.
Graphs are displayed in Figures (8) and (11) . Whatever the correlation between signals is, increasing the precision of one signal raises the variance of the price and its correlation with the true value of the asset. The mean and variance of the volume tend also to increase. The coecient o f v ariation, the skewness and the kurtosis linger inside a narrow band. As in case 1, they are the lowest when the precision of the signals is high and their correlation low.
In the third experiment, I increase the quality of the two traders' signals independently, while maintaining at zero the correlation between signals. Graphs are displayed in Figures (12) and (15) . Whatever the precision of one trader's signal is, increasing the precision of the other trader's signal increases the variance of the price, its correlation with the true value of the asset, and the volume mean and variance. The coecient of variation, the skewness and the kurtosis display non-linear patterns while varying little. Notice that those variables attain a valley when the precision of both signals precision are the highest.
In the fourth experiment, I vary the variance of the liquidity shock and the common information precision of the traders. The correlation of their signals is kept xed at zero. (16) and (19). Recall that, the way the liquidity demand has been constructed, without informed traders, the variance of the market-clearing price would be equal to the variance of the liquidity shock 2 " . From the onset, the distribution of the true value of the asset was set equal to the distribution of the market-clearing price with no informed trading. As the variance of the true value of the asset is xed to unity, 1 represents the \reference" level for the liquidity shock v ariance, which gives an idea of the range of 2 " used in the current experiment. Increasing the liquidity v ariance raises the mean and variance of the volume while increasing the variance of the price and decreasing its informativeness. Notice that the eect of a higher liquidity shock v ariance on the observable characteristics of price and volume are qualitatively the same as for an increase in the traders' information precision, while the eect on the price informativeness is ipped around. An increase in the informativeness of the private signals may be distinguished from an increase in the liquidity v ariance via the size of the eect on the observable characteristics of price and volume. Making the liquidity noise more volatile increase the variance of the volume much more than its mean, whereas increasing the precision of the informed traders' signals has roughly the same eect on both variables. However, in the current example the slope of the liquidity demand is set equal to one, results could be sensitive to this parameter.
Graphs are displayed in Figures

3 Conclusion
The paper relates patterns of the market price and the trading volume to the distribution of information across traders. Through numerical examples, it is shown that, when traders have better information, the mean and variance of the trading volume and the variance of the market price tend to be higher, and that the market price naturally becomes more informative. The eect of an increase in the liquidity shock v ariance is similar (though smaller), except of course for the price informativeness. Varying the correlation between the informed traders' signals has a smaller eect than varying the information quality, except for the coecient o f v ariation, skewness and kurtosis, which are very sensitive to the correlation across the informed traders' signals. In particular, fat tails for volume (i.e., high kurtosis) do not indicate that the traders' information about the asset value is highly precise.
Increasing the correlation across the informed traders' signals (so that the traders agree more with each other) lowers the volume mean and the price variance, while increasing the volume variance. The dierence in the impact of varying the correlation between the informed traders' signals and the true asset value (the precision of their information), and varying the correlation across their signals (the degree of consensus) on the observable price and volume statistics could help us distinguish between public and private information, since public information would increase the degree of consensus among traders while making them more informed, whereas private information would aect primarily the precision of one or more informed trader's signals without increasing the degree of consensus amomg traders. Proposition (2) shows that the characteristics of the traded volume will be in fact determined by the interactions between the individual demand schedules, in particular their covariances. Indeed, a sum of independently and identically distributed random variables have the same coecient of variation, skewness and kurtosis as each random variable in the sum. Now, we use the fact that y 1 + y 2 + y 3 = 0 . Let ij = cov(y i ; y j ), = 12 , 2 i = var(y i ), and ij = cov(y i ; y j ), s = 1 2 . Using the fact that y 1 + y 2 + y 3 = 0, we get 2 3 = 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 12 = 1 2 (s + 1 s + 2 ), and after some manipulations 
